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THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
STEPHEN F. SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

This Conference, like a growing body of academic
literature, discusses the phenomenon of conservative judicial
activism. Has the Rehnquist Court been "activist"-whatever
that means-in its approach to constitutional adjudication?
With recent rumors that Chief Justice Rehnquist will soon
announce his retirement, this is a particularly topical subject.
Indeed, even now, one sees the first chiselings of the Court's
epitaph, with Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, for example,
declaring that the Rehnquist Court has been nothing short of a
"disaster" due to its rampant conservative activism.1 The
question of whether, and to what extent, the Rehnquist Court
is "activist" or practices the "restraint" that judicial
traditionally
preach
will
likely figure
conservatives
prominently in the ultimate assessment of the Court's
jurisprudence.
Much of this Conference addresses this question within the
context of the revival of federalism-based limits on Congress
over the last decade. The allure of federalism as a topic for
discussion is understandable, yet it should not obscure other
important developments from the Rehnquist Court. In fact, I
would argue that constitutional criminal procedure provides a
better context within which to test the Rehnquist Court's
commitment to judicial restraint than federalism. In this
Essay, therefore, I examine the topic at hand against the
* Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. This essay is
based on oral remarks presented at the Ninth Annual Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr.
Conference on "Conservative Judicial Activism," sponsored by The Byron R. White
Center for the Study of American Constitutional Law and held on October 19-20,
2001, at the University of Colorado School of Law. I am grateful to Bob Nagel for
the opportunity to participate in the conference and to my fellow panelists and
conference participants for a wonderful exchange of ideas.
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1
WASH. U. J.L. & POLy 37, 37 (1999).
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background of the many important developments that have
taken place in criminal procedure on Rehnquist's watch. The
results of this examination are surprising because they suggest
that activism is not necessarily the antithesis of restraint.
That is to say, although the Court has indeed been activist in
criminal procedure, its activism may ultimately serve the goal
of judicial restraint. If in fact it does, then believers in judicial
restraint should embrace rather than condemn the Court's
activism.
I.

THE RELEVANCE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE
PROBLEM WITH FEDERALISM

In any assessment of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence,
constitutional criminal procedure should take center stage.
After all, if there was a single issue that gave rise to the
Rehnquist Court, it was criminal procedure. "Law and order"
was probably the campaign issue that contributed the most to
the string of Republican presidential victories that allowed
Richard M. Nixon and his three Republican successors to name
the next ten Justices following the retirement of Chief Justice
Earl Warren in 1969.2 The strategy proved so successful that it
is now accepted as a political axiom that, whether crime rates
are up or not, voters in national elections will not elect a
3
candidate who is "soft" on crime.
From 1968-1992, when Republican presidential candidates
had a "lock" on the crime issue, criminal procedure reform
emerged as an important factor in judicial selection, as opposed
2. Eleven, if you count Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice in 1986. On
the significance of crime in presidential elections from Nixon to Bill Clinton, see
Harry A. Chernoff, et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 577
(1994).
3. See, e.g., id. (noting that "control of the crime issue is a necessary, though
perhaps not sufficient, requirement for political victory in America"). As Professor
William Stuntz cogently demonstrates, however, the problem goes far beyond
mere electioneering. The modern expanse of the criminal law reflects a deeper,
"pathological" form of politics in which the fully accountable players in the
criminal justice system-legislators and prosecutors-collude to expand the
breadth and depth of the criminal law and thereby limit the power of courts to
protect the interests of the accused.
See generally William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523-79 (2001)

[hereinafter, Stuntz, Pathological Politics]. The bottom of this slippery slope,
Stuntz argues, is a criminal law so broad that "the law on the books makes
everyone a felon," subject to the good graces--or whims-of police and
prosecutors. Id. at 511.
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to merely a strategy for winning votes. Nixon endeavored to
appoint justices who would, in his words, "strengthen the hand
of the peace forces" as against the "criminal forces."4 President
Ronald W. Reagan, the architect of the national "war on drugs,"
likewise stressed criminal procedure reform in judicial
selection.5
Therefore, criminal procedure should figure
prominently in any coherent story of the Rehnquist Court.
Needless to say, criminal procedure reform is hardly the
only development of significance from the current Court.
Indeed, if asked, most academics today would probably identify
the Court most closely with some version of federalism. 6 The
fascination
with
federalism
is
both
natural
and
understandable.
There is quite a divide between current
notions of federalism as an important, judicially enforceable
constitutional value and the prior rule that federalism is
merely a prudential concern for Congress to consider (or not) as
it sees fit. 7 For myself and other believers in the importance of
structural guarantees of liberty, these developments are as

4. Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to
Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to be Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States, reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON, 1971, at 1055 (1972).
5. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 302-04 (1997) (noting that the
Reagan Administration carefully screened potential judicial nominees for
"toughness" on crime). Reagan's emphasis on criminal procedure reform made
sense given his fervent, if simplistic, belief that the drug problem and the larger
"crime epidemic" were caused by "liberal judges who are unwilling to get tough
with the criminal element in this society." 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN 1348 (1989). By contrast, President
George W. Bush was far less ideological than Reagan in judicial selection, putting
a greater premium on ease of Senate confirmation than judicial philosophy. See
DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 191 (1999). To be sure, Bush braved
the political firestorm and selected as his second pick for the High Court thenJudge Clarence Thomas, who today arguably is the most conservative member of
the Rehnquist Court. The motivation, however, was political, not ideological-an
attempt to placate conservatives disappointed with Bush's first nominee, Justice
David H. Souter, and to avoid criticism for replacing retiring Justice Thurgood
Marshall with a white nominee. Id. at 193.
6. For a useful categorization of modern federalism doctrines, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 431, 452-68 (2002).
7. Compare, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking
down on federalism grounds the civil damages provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act) with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(rejecting federalism-based limits on Congress).
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welcome as they are anathema to advocates of the prior
8
regime.
The danger of fixating on federalism, however, is that it
may distract attention from other areas of doctrine-here,
criminal procedure-that played a significant role in shaping
the Rehnquist Court's legacy. A particularly striking example
is a provocative recent article by Professors Jack Balkin and
Sanford Levinson contending that the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions amount to a "constitutional revolution." 9
Curiously, however, they do not regard criminal procedure as
part of that revolution because, in their view, "the Rehnquist
Court has simply carried on the work of its predecessors" in
that field. 10 This assertion proves far too much-and too little.
If novelty is the test of a doctrinal "revolution," then the
"New Federalism" joins criminal procedure and virtually every
other area of doctrine in flunking it. The idea that states
retain some measure of sovereignty and therefore enjoy greater
immunity from suit than the Eleventh Amendment literally
provides predates the Rehnquist Court by almost 100 years."
The notion that there are enforceable limits on the reach of the
Commerce Power traces its lineage back to the very
foundations of the Republic and, until the New Deal,
represented the prevailing understanding of the Commerce
Clause. 2
The last broad category of recent federalism

8. The literature addressing the recent developments in federalism is
immense, and much of it is sharply critical of those developments. See, e.g., Peter
M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative
Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000). For some friendly appraisals of
the rebirth of federalism, see, for example, Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism:Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); Steven G. Calabresi, "A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995).
9. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1056 (2001) (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 1056.
11. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
This "immunity
interpretation" of the Eleventh Amendment has been considered settled law long
for decades. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) ("While the
[Eleventh] amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a state by its own
citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune
from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of
another state.") (citing cases).
12. See Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A
Normative Defense, reprinted in 574 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 24 (Frank Goodman, ed. 2001) (noting that the
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cases, was itself
decisions, the so-called "anti-commandeering"
13
foreshadowed by prior decisions.
Indeed, if Balkin and Levinson are correct that judicial
doctrine is not revolutionary unless it is completely novel in
light of prior doctrine, then the famous Warren Court
"Revolution" in criminal procedure was itself badly misnamed.
To be sure, the specific rules announced by the Court were a
stunning break from the past in terms of doctrine and
precedent. The novelty melts away, though, on a more global
look at the Court's historical record in criminal procedure.
The great blows struck by the Warren Court were, on the
conventional academic account at least, intended as a
counterweight to institutionalized racism in the criminal
justice system. 14 If that widely shared yet inadequately
documented characterization is accurate-and I have my
doubtsl 5-then there was really nothing new about what the
Supreme Court enforced federalism-based limits on Congress "from the time of
the Founding up through 1937"). Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
for example, left no doubt that Congress was not given, and therefore lacks, the
power to regulate "the exclusively internal commerce of a State." Id. at 195.
Gibbons and other notable pre-New Deal Commerce Clause precedents are
discussed at length in the various opinions supporting the result in" United Stat's
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See id. at 552-54 (majority opinion); id. at 568-72
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 585-600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
13. Examples would include Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and FERC v. Mississippi, 452 U.S.
264 (1982), where the Court cast serious doubt on congressional power to compel
the states to regulate. In later cases formally embracing anti-commandeering, the
Rehnquist Court ruled that Hodel and FERC "ha[d] made clear that the Federal
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive
action, federal regulatory programs." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925
(1997); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992).
14. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
CriminalProcedureand CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 49 (1997) [hereinafter,
Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship] (describing combating racism as the "conventional
understanding" of Warren-era doctrine).
15. I have raised the possibility elsewhere that the Warren Court's criminal
procedure jurisprudence may have had less to do with race than generalized
concerns about the unfairness of the criminal justice system for all indigent
defendants. See Stephen F. Smith, Taking Lessons from the Left? Judicial
Activism of the Right, - GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y - (forthcoming 2002) (on file with
the author). Unfortunately, minorities are disproportionately poor, so there is a
correlation between race and indigency, yet the two concerns are distinct. Not to
put too fine a point on it, but blacks were lynched, beaten into giving false
confessions, convicted of crimes they did not commit, and excluded from juries in
the South not because they were poor, but because they were black in an era of
white supremacy. If the prevailing orthodoxy is right that fighting racism was the
motivation behind Warren-era criminal procedure, then it is positively baffling
that the Court repeatedly took a pass on areas of criminal justice-most glaringly,
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Warren Court did. After all, the Supreme Court's expansion of
the Constitution to combat racism in the criminal justice
system began decades before Warren's ascent to the Supreme
16
Court.
In each instance, whether it is Rehnquist's federalism or
Warren's criminal procedure, one might argue, as Balkin and
Levinson do, that these developments were insignificant
because the Court simply "followed in the shoes" of its
predecessors. Nevertheless, they and other scholars agree on
the significance of the Rehnquist Court's contributions to
federalism, as a conceptual matter at least. 17 Likewise, the
the death penalty-where racism often comes into play. See generally Michael J.
Klarman, Is the Supreme Court Sometimes Irrelevant? Race and the Southern
Criminal Justice System in the 1940s, 89 J. AM. HIST. 119, 141-42 (2002)
[hereinafter, Klarman, Sometimes Irrelevant]. At times, the problem went beyond
inattention, with the Warren Court affirmatively endorsing controversial law
enforcement practices that could be used to racist ends. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (approving "stop and frisk" detentions and searches based on
"suspicions" that fall short of probable cause); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965) (allowing prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to strike prospective
black jurors, even in racially charged cases involving black defendants, unless
blacks are never allowed to serve on any criminal juries in a particular
jurisdiction), overruled in relevant part, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Racism undoubtedly explains why the Court granted certiorari in a number of
cases, but it is hard to see how the rules the Court generated could be expected to
counter the pernicious effects of racist law enforcement.
1]6. For example, long before the Warren Court, discriminatory exclusion of
black jurors had been struck down on equal protection grounds, see, e.g., Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880),
and criminal trials conducted in a "lynch mob" atmosphere had been condemned
as contrary to the fair adjudication required by due process, see Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). These key early criminal procedure developments
are carefully analyzed in Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins Of Modern
Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000). In later work, Professor
Klarman argues that these early decisions, though important for other reasons in
the larger struggle for racial justice, had "virtually no impact on southern
criminal justice in cases involving allegations of serious black-on-white crime,
such as rape or murder." Klarman, supra note 15, at 120. Another important
example is habeas corpus: by the time Warren became Chief Justice, the Supreme
Court had already expanded the "Great Writ" from its narrow common law
reaches to a broad vehicle for de novo federal court review of the constitutionality
of state court convictions. See generally Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint:
Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1065-67 (2002)
[hereinafter, Smith, Activism as Restraint] (tracing evolution of modern habeas
doctrine).
17. See generally Fallon, supra note 6, at 429-30. Even after more than a
decade of Balkin and Levinson's "constitutional revolution," several prominent
scholars question the real-world significance of the federalism decisions. See, e.g.,
John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47,49 (1998) ("The Eleventh Amendment almost never matters....
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Warren Court's jurisprudence in criminal procedure has been
8
recognized, by supporters and critics alike, as "revolutionary."
Moreover, Balkin and Levinson sell the Rehnquist Court
short on criminal procedure reform. To be sure, prior courts
adopted a "law and order" approach to criminal procedure.
Nonetheless, after Warren Court decisions like Miranda and
Mapp v. Ohio,' 9 Nixon hoped that the new Burger Court would
roll back decisions that "handcuffed" police
and freed the
guilty.
While making some strides in that direction,
particularly in the area of habeas corpus, 20 the Burger Court
never seriously jeopardized its predecessor's legacy. Although
the Burger Court chipped away at certain Warren Court
21
precedents, it actually expanded others in important ways. It
even invalidated capital punishment as then administered
nationwide 22-not exactly the "law and order" results Nixon
23
had promised.
In almost every case where action against the state is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, suit against a state officer is permitted under [42 U.S.C.] Section
1983."); Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLuM. L.
REV. 1911, 1915 (1995) (arguing that "prevailing Spending Clause doctrine
appears to vitiate much of the import of Lopez and any progeny it may have").
18. See, e.g., Carol Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Crimindl
Procedure?Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996).
19. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Miranda limited the use of so-called "unwarned"
confessions-that is to say, confessions not preceded by the now-famous Miranda
warnings. Mapp required state courts to exclude at trial evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
20. For an overview of the Burger Court's retrenchment on habeas corpus,
see generally Smith, Activism as Restraint, supra note 16, at 1070-74.
21. A good example is Brewer v. Williams, 430 U;S. 387 (1977), often
referred to as the "Christian burial" case. Brewer involved Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), which had held that the police cannot deliberately
elicit incriminating statements from a defendant, in the absence of his attorney,
once formal adversary proceedings have been initiated. The defendant in Brewer
(who was known to be religious) was shamed into leading authorities to the
remains of a-little girl he had murdered by police statements that she would be
denied the Christian burial she deserved unless her body was discovered before
an expected snowstorm hit. The Williams Court expanded Massiah beyond
explicit interrogation to apply to police statements that facilitate incriminating
answers from a suspect, ruling that the defendant's statements should have been
excluded from evidence. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 405-06.
22. -See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Court
allowed executions to resume with its decision four years later in Gregg v.
Georgia,428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. These surprising developments led some scholars to minimize the
significance of the Burger Court's jurisprudence in criminal procedure. See, e.g.,
Steiker, supra note 18, at 2467-68. (citing sources). Clearly, however, the
retrenchment in criminal procedure was significant, as Professor Steiker has
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The radical revisions hoped for by conservatives did indeed
come, albeit not from the Burger Court and not in the form of
overrulings. Rather, the Rehnquist Court has proceeded on the
realization that the guillotine is not the only way to produce a
revolution and, indeed, sometimes may not even be the most
effective way. As French history teaches, revolution can
backfire. After all, the flames fanned by the Revolution of
1789, and fueled so famously by the guillotine, were doused by
the Thermidorean Reaction. 24 So it was in criminal procedure.
The boldness and creativity of the Warren Court in criminal
procedure inspired many, but ultimately produced a Rehnquist
Court majority determined to swing the pendulum back in the
direction of law enforcement. 25
One of the most significant developments from the
Rehnquist Court-habeas anti-retroactivity doctrine-proved
utterly devastating to the Warren Court's federal vision of
criminal procedure. 26
This vision rested on two key
principles-first, that federal constitutional rules should
govern all key stages of the. law enforcement process, and,
second, that the federal courts should be the ultimate guardian
of federal constitutional rights.
, This broad, remedial vision of habeas corpus survived the
Burger years, if not unscathed, at least intact. 27 The Rehnquist
shown. See generally id. at 2504-32.
24.
See D.M.G. SUTHERLAND, FRANCE 1789-1815: REVOLUTION AND
COUNTERREVOLUTION 248-64 (1986).
25. Miranda is an example of how, even without overrulings, Warren Court
doctrines were changed in ways that favored law enforcement. See generally
Smith, Activism as Restraint, supra note 16, at 1109-11. Suffice it to say here
that Miranda has gone from a doctrine that seemed to spell the end of confessions
to a doctrine that the police can usually work around without much difficulty.
Indeed, from the defendant's perspective, the current state of affairs is even worse
than that because, absent physical abuse or other obviously coercive interrogation
techniques, administration of Miranda warnings essentially dooms to failure any
claim by the defendant that his confession was involuntary. See, e.g., Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984). It therefore is no wonder that the
Rehnquist Court saw no need to overrule Miranda in Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
26. This paragraph builds on a more extensive discussion in Smith, Activism
as Restraint,supra note 16, at 1062-77.
27. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Burger Court boldly offered
a much narrower view of habeas corpus-that its function ought to be simply to
vindicate factually innocent defendants who were wrongfully convicted. The idea
never took hold outside of the exclusionary-rule context dealt with in Stone itself.
As such, with the sole exception of Fourth Amendment claims, habeas corpus
offered the prospect of full, de novo relitigation in federal court of federal
constitutional claims that were properly preserved in the state court system. To
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2s
Court, however, buried it in. a single case, Teague v. Lane.
There, the Court held that habeas corpus should be available
only to deter egregious misconduct by state courts, a far
29
narrower role than remedying constitutional errors.
Henceforth, habeas corpus would only be used to enforce "old"
law, barring claims seeking "new law" in habeas cases except in
30
truly extraordinary circumstances.
Teague is a counterrevolution wrapped into a single case.
Because of the breadth of Teague's definition of "newness," it is
virtually impossible for state court prisoners to get their claims
heard on the merits in federal court. 31 To the extent there are
any "gaps" between the legal rule announced in prior cases and
the case at hand, or between the factual context in which a
prior rule was announced and the present case, the prisoner's
claim is "new" and therefore barred by Teague. As every
litigator knows, the facts of two cases are almost never
identical, but this is particularly true in an area as dynamic as
criminal procedure. In criminal procedure, there are lots of
moving parts-law enforcement .behavior, legislative crime
definition, legislative funding-allocation decisions, and
prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining decisions-that can
and do adjust in response to court decisions. 32 Given the
fluidity of the criminal justice system, new legal questions
constantly arise, and it will be difficult for the Supreme Court
to foresee the variation at the time it is formulating a rule of
constitutional law. 33 All of these questions are off-limits to
habeas under Teague.

this extent, the Warren Court vision remained alive and well throughout the
Burger years.
28. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
29. See id. at 306. The Court thus explicitly adopted Justice Harlan's view
of retroactivity, which previously had never commanded majority support. See,
e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
31. See id.. at 301 (defining a "new" rule is one that is not literally "dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final")
(emphasis added).
32. For the best demonstration of this point and its implications for
constitutional regulation of criminal procedure, see generally Stuntz, Uneasy
Relationship, supra note 14.
33. Even the most comprehensive opinion in criminal procedureMiranda-left lots of unanswered questions, questions that the federal courts
struggled with for decades. By the time of Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428 (2000), the Supreme Court itself had decided close to sixty case involving
Miranda questions, id. at 462-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and the lower federal
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The discussion so far relates only to the second element of
the Warren Court vision-namely, federal court enforcement of
federal rights. The problems run deeper, however.
The
Warren Court envisioned the federal courts, and the Supreme
Court in particular, as the expositor of the body of law known
as constitutional criminal procedure, as well as its enforcer.
Teague cuts the lower federal courts out of the lawmaking
equation altogether, so far as state cases are concerned. True,
the district and circuit courts can make new criminal procedure
rules in the context of federal criminal prosecutions, but those
34
rules cannot bind state courts.
Of course, the Supreme Court can still make new law
binding on states on certiorari from the state courts or in
federal cases.
One obvious point in response is that the
Rehnquist Court is far less inclined, as an ideological matter,
than the Warren Court was to disagree with state court
decisions rejecting claims by criminal defendants.35 The larger,
less obvious point is that exclusive reliance on the Supreme
Court is itself a repudiation of the Warren Court vision. That
vision was premised upon the realization that, due to docket
constraints, the Supreme Court cannot adequately police the
administration of justice in the state courts without the aid of
the lower federal courts.3 6 . Teague, however, prevents the
courts countless more.
34. Only decisions of the Supreme Court can bind state courts. See generally
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 825 (1995). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") implicitly recognizes this point, allowing habeas relief only
in cases where state court violated or unreasonably applied "clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
35. See infra note 39 and accompanying text; see generally Michael E.
Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-first Century,
35 IND. L. REV. 335, 354 (2002) (noting the declining rates of reversal of state
court decisions from the Warren Court to the Rehnquist Court). Although most
state judges are elected and therefore must be "tough" on crime, they are also
"softer" on crime, meaning more solicitous of the interests of defendants, than
prosecutors and legislators. See generally Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra
note 3, at 540-42. Given their tough-but-not-too-tough attitudes on crime, plus
the decline of virulent racism in the criminal justice system, the attitudes of
contemporary state judges are likely to mirror the Rehnquist Court's on criminal
procedure. If true, this means that state courts today will be likely to avoid gross
disregard, or aggressive expansion, of constitutional criminal procedure, the two
decisional outcomes that would be of most concern to the Rehnquist Court.
36. See Smith, Activism as Restraint, supra note 16, at 1063 n.30. The sheer
volume of criminal cases in state courts, which account for the overwhelming
majority of criminal litigation even after the explosion of the federal criminal law
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lower federal courts from performing the close, case-by-case
scrutiny of state court convictions that the Warren Court
deemed essential.
So, after Teague, who has primary responsibility for the
fair administration of justice in state criminal cases? Certainly
not the federal courts. As it did before the criminal procedure
revolution, that responsibility lies with the state courts. Due to
Teague as much as all the chipping away that has occurred
since Warren's retirement, state courts need not fear reversal
by a habeas court. As long as state courts do not flout clear
constitutional mandates that are directly on point, habeas
relief will almost always be denied.37 Consequently, state
courts again have the final word on the meaning and
application of federal law, subject only to the small possibility
of a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. In other words,
the Warren Court vision for the federal courts in criminal
procedure is officially dead, thanks to the Rehnquist Court.

II. "ACTIVISM" AND "RESTRAINT" FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

This sea-change in criminal procedure brings us to the
subject of conservative judicial activism. Everyone knows the
roll-back in criminal procedure was conservative; one of the
defining characteristics of judicial conservatism is "toughness"
on crime, or a strong disposition to favor the prosecution and
38
the interests of crime victims over the criminally accused.

since the 1960s, makes it inevitable that Supreme Court intervention can only be
sporadic. Such oversight, needless to say, is unlikely to be effective in changing
the behavior of lower courts.
37. According to the most recent statistics available, ninety-nine percent of
all habeas petitions are unsuccessful. See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART

1364 (4, ed.
1996) (reporting data from early 1990s). Successful prisoner petitions will, in all
likelihood, become even more rare under the restrictive standards of the AEDPA.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (prescribing a one-year statute of limitations for
habeas actions); id. at § 2254(d)(1) (imposing more stringent standard of review
for habeas filings).
38. See generally Fallon, supra note 6, at 447 (listing identifying
characteristics of judicial conservatism). Of course, "toughness" on crime is not
the only substantive value cherished by judicial conservatives, id., and where that
value conflicts with other conservative values-such as federalism-a
conservative court may side with the criminal defendant. See, e.g., United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (agreeing with the criminal defendant's contention
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is beyond the scope of the Commerce Power).
AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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The real question is whether or not the roll-back in
constitutional criminal procedure was "activist."
Defining "activism" turns out to be a difficult enterprise.
Usually, the term is used as an epithet-a charge to be leveled
at a judicial decision or style of judging that one finds
objectionable. 9 So, for example, conservatives outraged at the
perceived excesses of the Warren Court hammered away at the
Court for being activist, and liberals distressed at the current
resurgence of federalism are giving the Rehnquist Court the
same rough treatment. For all the resonance and rhetorical
power that the charge of "activism" has as a tool for criticizing
court decisions, it is surprising how little effort has been made
to define the concept.4 °
One thing that seems fairly clear is that Occam's Razor
does not hold in this context; the simplest definition of activism
cannot be considered the best. Some have argued, for example,
that an activist decision is simply one that declares
unconstitutional action of other branches of government.4 1
Though simple, this definition cannot be reconciled with the

39. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 198 (1985) (referring to judicial activism as "apremier term of judicial
opprobrium"). Occasionally, the term is used in neutral fashion. For example, in
his treatment of the Burger Court's response to the liberal jurisprudence of the
Warren Court, Vincent Blasi argues that both Courts were activist. See, e.g.,
Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 201 (1983) (arguing that the Burger
Court activist in part because of "its preservation of the activist landmark
precedents of the Warren era.. . ."). To him, what differentiated the two Courts
was not that one was "activist" and the other "restrained," but rather the way in
which both Courts used activism. The Warren Court's activism was "rooted" in a
"vision of the equal dignity of man," id. at 212, whereas the Burger Court's was
.rootless" and "reflect[ed] no deep-seated vision of the constitutional scheme or of
the specific constitutional clauses in dispute." Id. at 216-17.
40. See Bradley C. Canon, The Framework For The Analysis Of Judicial
Activism, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385 (Stephen C. Halpern

& Charles M. Lamb, eds, 1982) (noting that "conceptions of activism are usually
not explicitly noted or articulated").
41. See, e.g., Glendon Schubert, A Functional Interpretation, in THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT 17 (David F. Forte, ed. 1972) (noting that a court "is activist whenever
its policies are in conflict with those of other major decision-makers"); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'y 37, 37 (1999) (arguing that a court is activist if it "shows little deference to
the majoritarian branches of government"). Richard Posner advances a similar
definition of activism: To him, an activist decision is one that expands the "power
of the federal courts vis-a-vis the other organs of government." Posner, supra note
39, at 210.
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premises of American-style judicial review. UnderMarbury v.
Madison,42 a written constitution trumps lesser law, including
statutes,
and a statute that is repugnant to the Constitution is
"void. '43 As a result, when the Constitution and lesser law
point to different resolutions of a case or controversy, it is "the
very essence of judicial duty" for the court to follow the
44
Constitution and declare the lesser law unconstitutional.
Given Marbury, it would be odd to say that a judicial
decision is "activist" whenever it invalidates the actions of the
other branches of government. A court that strikes down an
unconstitutional act, where necessary to the resolution of a real
case or controversy, has done precisely what it is supposed to
do in our system. 45 Such a court, therefore, cannot be
considered "activist."
What, then, does "activism" mean? Space does not permit
me to offer a comprehensive discussion of activism here. 46 For
now, the key issue is the extent, if any, to which fidelity to
precedent factors into the definition of activism. This is so
because the bulk of the constitutional rules and limitations
that occupy the attention of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges in criminal cases are creatures of precedent.

42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
43. Id. at 180; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 436 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1999) (.[The written Constitution] supposes that the power of the
people is superior to both [the judicial and legislative power]; and that where the
will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
instead of the former.").
44. Id. at 178.
45. Of course, the theory of judicial review under Marbury does not entitle
federal courts to invalidate action of other branches simply because that action
strikes them as bad policy. The courts are duty-bound to enforce the Constitution,
no more and no less-in other words, to "say what the law is." id. at 177.
Delineating the point at which courts have gone beyond constitutional
enforcement, however, is quite difficult, if not impossible, without choosing sides
in intramural disputes over the proper theories of constitutional interpretation.
Perhaps the most that can be said to represent anything approaching a consensus
view is that courts have discretion in resolving indeterminate questionsquestions that the Constitution itself does not specifically answer-but may not
reach results at odds with constitutional text. See generally Smith, Activism as
Restraint, supra note 16, at 1084-86. For a spirited defense of the primacy of the
Constitution over judicial doctrine, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000) [hereinafter, Amar, Document and
Doctrine].
46. I offer a more detailed definition of activism in Smith, Activism as
Restraint,supra note 16, at 1077-94.
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Much of criminal procedure-whether under Warren,
Burger, or Rehnquist-has not involved constitutional
interpretation in the sense that we know it from other areas of
constitutional law. Constitutional criminal procedure tends
not to be guided by the usual theories of constitutional
interpretation,
such
as
textualism,
representationreinforcement, originalism, or tradition. 47 Instead, interestbalancing takes center stage in criminal procedure, and has for
decades.
Consider a century-old issue-whether, and to what
extent, illegally seized evidence should be admissible at trial.
The Fourth Amendment neither provides for nor logically
implies that illegally seized evidence should be excluded from
evidence in a criminal trial.48 The traditional response of the
courts to illegal searches was not a "get-out-of-jail-free" card for
the guilty but rather a damages action against the offending
49
officer of the law.

Ever since Weeks v. United States,50 the Court has charted
a completely different course. In Weeks, the Court created the
exclusionary rule for federal prosecutions, reasoning that,
absent the rule, the Fourth Amendment "is of no value, and...
might as well be stricken from the Constitution."51 Fifty years
later, the Supreme Court, invoking what it described as
"reason and truth," extended the exclusionary rule to state
prosecutions.5 2 In its more recent cases, the Court has found
47. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure,
33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1132 (1996). For a careful discussion of the various
interpretive methods that are utilized in constitutional law, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a ConstitutionalTheory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 540-57
(1999). Critics on both ends of the political spectrum might protest that these
methods do not actually drive the search for constitutional meaning but rather
serve as ex post justifications for decisions reached on other grounds. Even if true,
the objection would not diminish the force of the comparison. It would still be
significant that, outside of criminal procedure, the Court at least feels the need to
justify its constitutional decisions by invoking some accepted interpretive
methodology.
48. See U.S. Const. amend IV ("The right of the people to be secure...
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. .. ").
49. For an excellent discussion of these points, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).
50. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
51. Id. at 393.
52. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). In so ruling, Mapp rejected
the Court's previous holding in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), that Weeks
was merely an exercise of the Court's power of supervision over the lower federal
courts and not a construction of the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at

20021 REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1351

exclusion of illegally seized evidence to. be unnecessary, in
many instances, to maintain what it deems "sufficient"
deterrence against police misbehavior. 53 The common thread
running throughout the exclusionary-rule cases is that judicial
policy assessments-precedent, in other words-determines
the applicable constitutional rules.
Consequently, determining whether the Rehnquist Court
has been activist in criminal procedure depends in large part
on whether or not precedent figures into the definition of
activism. There appear to be two schools of thought on this
issue. The first, more traditional view, is that activism does
incorporate some notion of fidelity to precedent. The basic idea
seems to be that, at least in a precedent-based system, courts
are generally supposed to follow binding precedent, and failure
to do so should be considered activist. 54 Not surprisingly, this
view is central to recent accusations of conservative judicial
activism because so many of the results the Rehnquist Court
has reached-in criminal procedure, federalism,
and
elsewhere-would not have occurred had the Court fully
adhered to prior precedent. 55
The second, less widely held view is that precedent is a
constitutional irrelevancy, if not unconstitutional in its own
right.5 6 On this view, the Constitution (or, on questions of
653-55 (overruling Wolf).
53. For example, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court
crafted a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court grounded its
decision on a cost-benefit calculus: suppressing probative evidence of guilt where
the police relied in good faith on a defective search warrant would have only
"marginal or nonexistent benefits" yet would impose "substantial costs." Id. at
922. Similarly police-laden inquiries have led to additional exclusionary-rule
exceptions. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 364 (1998) (holding that Mapp does not apply to parole-revocation hearings);
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988) (ruling that exclusion is not
warranted where evidence obtained during an illegal search would have been
discovered anyway through legal means).
54. See, e.g., Canon, supra note 40, at 392-93 (noting that the definition of
activism includes "the degree to which a Supreme Court decision either retains or
abandons precedent or existing judicial doctrine").
55. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 37 (arguing that the Rehnquist
Court is activist because it "has little respect for precedent"); Shane, supra note 8,
at 225 (suggesting that activism exists when, as in the federalism cases, a court
"is self-consciously creative in generating a largely unprecedented constitutional
outcome.. . ."); Donald H. Ziegler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1367,
1369 (1996) (stating that "judges are considered activist when they ...overrule
prior precedent").
56. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 23 (1994).
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statutory interpretation, the relevant Act of Congress) is the
exclusive yardstick by which the performance of the Supreme
Court should be measured. As such, if a decision is "right"
under written law, it is irrelevant that it is "wrong" as a matter
of precedent.
Given that choice, the argument goes, the
Supreme Court should disregard the precedent and follow the
57
Constitution or the statute.
In my view, both schools of thought are right-and both
are wrong as well. It is right to say that judges are bound to
uphold the Constitution. The same Constitution that confers
jurisdiction on federal judges to decide cases or controversies
58
also declares that it is "the supreme Law of the Land."
Clearly, the Constitution would not be the "paramount and
fundamental law"59 Marbury held it to be if its commands
could, in effect, be erased by judge-made doctrine that is
repugnant to the Constitution.
To this extent, even the
strongest believer in precedent would probably agree that "[i]f
the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision says Y, a
court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the
Constitution." 60 Any other view, as Professor Akhil Amar aptly
explained, would "submerge the document and privilege the
doctrine," leaving us with the perversity of "constitutionalism
without the Constitution."6 '
It does not follow, however, that precedent is an irrelevant
or improper consideration. Precedent is an important feature
of our judicial system, and has been since the time of the
Founding. Previously, the dominant "declaratory" theory of
precedent was that court decisions were "evidence" of the law,
not themselves law.6 2 These ideas, however, gave way by the
57. Note that, even on this view, different considerations may apply to the
lower federal courts, as they assuredly do to state courts. The Vesting Clause of
Article III specifically denominates the lower federal courts as "inferior" to the
Supreme Court. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. A strong argument can be made that, by
branding them inferior to the Supreme Court, Article III obligates lower federal
courts to follow Supreme Court decisions. See Caminker, supra note 34, at 82834. For a skeptical view, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the
Rules of Precedent, 50 DuKE L.J. 503, 513-20 (2000).
58. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
60. Lawson, supra note 56, at 28.
61. Amar, Document and Doctrine, supra note 45, at 82, 84.
62. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 660 (1999).
Opponents of stare decisis sometimes assume that the declaratory theory is not a
theory of precedent-that, in other words, if precedents are not themselves law,
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time of Blackstone to the more modern notion of stare decisisthat courts have a "'general obligation' to follow prior
precedent.6 3 Blackstone himself, whose views were well known
to the Framers and accepted as authoritative, 64 declared that
"it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where
the same points come again in litigation," subject always to the
power to disregard precedents that are "manifestly absurd or
65

unjust."

In creating the Constitution, the Framers expected the
federal courts to decide cases or controversies within the
context of a precedential system. As Alexander Hamilton
argued: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty
in every particular case. '66 Precedent therefore was hardly a
foreign concept when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.
they are irrelevant. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis
By Statute: May Congress Remove The PrecedentialEffect Of Roe And Casey?, 109
YALE L.J. 1535, 1577 (2000). This, however, is a misconception. Even under the
declaratory view, courts seeking to determine what the law is "must start with
their own precedent." Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the
Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 84 (2000) (emphasis added). It is for this reason
that Alexander Hamilton, expounding on the task of Article III judges and the
qualifications for judicial office, stated that "precedents ... must demand long and
laborious study." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 439 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1999). Stated differently, under the declaratory view, precedents are not just
some evidence of what the law is, but rather good and sufficient evidence of the
law unless affirmatively proven to misrepresent the true state of the law. See,
e.g., Amar, Document and Doctrine, supra note 45, at 81, 87.
63. Id. at 661 (quoting MAX RADIN, STABILITY IN THE LAW 18 (1944)).
64. See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).
65.

1 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *69-

*70. As Professor Lee explains in his extensive treatment of the origins of stare
decisis, "Blackstone's venerable statements on the law of precedent (which
coincide with the period in which the United States Constitution was framed)
seem to chart a compromise course between the classic adoption of the declaratory
theory and a strict notion of stare decisis." Lee, supra note 62, at 662. Lee 's
statement that the Blackstonian view was not a "strict notion of stare decisis," id.,
is easily misunderstood out of context. To be sure, Blackstone did not endorse the
positivist notion that judicial decisions are themselves "law," but he most
certainly did have a robust understanding of stare decisis, as Lee himself
recognizes elsewhere in his study. See id. at 683 (explaining that "Blackstone
placed a weighty thumb on the scale in favor of the previous decision, with any
doubts being resolved in favor of staying the course"). Justice Scalia accurately
described the Blackstonian view as giving stare decisis "near-dispositive
strength." See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 473 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 439 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1999).
Hamilton was not alone in this view. See Lee, supra note 62, at 664-66 (noting
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If the Framers had intended the radical steps of jettisoning
the concept of precedent and adopting something other than
the familiar common law method of adjudication, surely there
would be some evidence of that radical intent. Such radical
change would have been enshrined in explicit constitutional
provisions, or the matter would have been discussed at the
Constitutional Convention or in state ratification debates. Not
only do no such provisions and discussion exist, but also, as
Hamilton noted, the Founding generation expected that the
federal courts would discharge their duties according to
precedent.67
At the same time, the view advanced by Rehnquist Court
critics that overruling precedent is always activist is untenable.
That view is supported neither by historical understandings of
precedent-which, as shown, never regarded the obligation to
follow precedent as absolute-nor by current stare decisis
doctrine. In terms of current doctrine, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable
command," particularly "in constitutional cases, because in
such cases 'correction through legislative action is practically
impossible.'

68

This aspect of modern stare decisis doctrine,

specifically recognizing the propriety of overrulings in certain
contexts, undermines the notion that overrulings are
inherently activist. If courts were always obligated to follow
precedent, stare decisis rules would say so instead of expressly
69
contemplating the propriety of overrulings.
similar views of James Madison, Chancellor James Kent, author of an influential
treatise, and William Cranch, the second reporter of Supreme Court decisions).
Chancellor Kent, for example, had this to say about precedent: "If a decision has
been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in
favor of its correctness; and the community have a right to regard it as a just
declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by
it." 1 James Kent, COMMENTARIES *475-*476.
67. This is not to suggest, however, that stare decisis is mandated by the
Constitution. I make only the more modest claim that stare decisis is a
constitutionally permissible rule for the courts to follow. For an argument that
stare decisis is of constitutional dimension, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare
Decisis and the Constitution:An Essay on ConstitutionalMethodology, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 570 (2001).
68. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also, e.g., Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
69. Stare decisis rules allow overrulings in a variety of circumstances, such
as where prior decisions have proven to be "unworkable," rest on changed factual
circumstances, or depend on theoretical foundations that have been undermined
by subsequent cases. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55
(1992). For a good discussion of these factors and how the Court has applied
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The key to reconciling these competing views of
interpretive fidelity comes from the purpose served by the
concept of activism. At its root, the notion of activism attempts
to identify judicial action that is illegitimate. In determining
the legitimacy of overrulings, stare decisis rules are the most
natural guidepost. After all, the obvious purpose of stare
decisis is to delineate precisely when precedents should be

overturned and when precedents should be followed. 70 To the
extent it appears circular to say that judge-made stare decisis
rules should determine the propriety of overrulings, the
apparent circularity is due to the fact that written federal
law-the Constitution and Acts of Congress-does not speak to
the question of when overrulings are proper, a question that
71
only stare decisis rules address.
Accordingly, consistent with stare decisis rules, in
determining whether an overruling was activist, one must look
to the reasons advanced for the overruling. Current stare
decisis rules emphasize that decisions may not be overruled
simply because they are considered to be wrong by a later
court. 72 Instead, in both constitutional and statutory cases,
"special justification" is required, in the form of a

them, see Paulsen, supra note 62, at 1551-64.
70. See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 ("Adhering to precedent 'is usually the
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
of law be settled than it be settled right.' Nevertheless, when governing decisions
are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to
follow precedent."') (citations omitted).
71. Though judge-made, it bears emphasis that stare decisis rules may not
properly be casually ignored by courts. Rather, those rules are "authoritative
legal rules," albeit legal rules that do not purport to be of constitutional
dimension. Harrison, supra note 57, at 508.
72. See generally Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous
Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (noting that the "conventional wisdom" is
that "a purported demonstration of error is not enough to justify overruling a past
decision"). In this respect, current stare decisis doctrine is overprotective of
precedent and underprotective of the supremacy of written law. As understood by
the Rehnquist Court, it is irrelevant how wrong a holding is: no matter how
egregiously wrong a precedent is, it may not be overruled without special
justification. The better view, I think, is the rule that the Court followed before
the Rehnquist years-namely, that a clear showing of error is itself a sufficient
justification for an overruling, barring unusually strong reliance interests
warranting continued adherence to precedent. The paradigmatic case of clear
error would be a decision resolving a question of interpretation in a manner that
is plainly contrary to the constitutional or statutory text in question. Outside the
realm of clear error, however, overrulings should not occur without special
justification. For similar views, see Amar, Document and Doctrine, supra note 45,
at 81-83.
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demonstration that a recognized ground for overruling exists,
before a court can properly depart from precedent.7 3 To do
otherwise-that is to say, to deviate from precedent without
74
special justification-should therefore be regarded as activist.
There is another important component to precedent that
bears directly on the activism question. Stare decisis rules not
only limit the proper occasions for overrulings; they also posit
that where a recognized ground for overruling does not exist,
prior precedent should be followed. The concept of following
precedent would be familiar to anyone schooled in the common
law tradition. The process of common law reasoning is that
present cases are resolved by analogy to past cases, so that the
law is a continuous whole running from past to present. Prior
cases establish what the right legal outcome is on a set of
"material" facts, and future cases where those same facts exist
should be resolved in accordance with past cases, absent a valid
ground for an overruling.75 In other words, stare decisis, and
therefore a precedent-based understanding of activism,
73. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)
(statutory case); see also, e.g., Harris v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2414(2002)
(holding that "[elven in constitutional cases, where stare decisis considerations are
less pronounced, we will not overrule a precedent absent 'special justification')
(quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
74. What, then, of overrulings of precedents that are clearly wrong? Under
my definition of activism, such overrulings are activist because mere error,
however clear, is not a recognized ground for overruling under current stare
decisis rules. This conclusion may seem inconsistent with my earlier claim that
clear error should be a valid ground for overruling, see supra note 72. In fact,
there is no inconsistency. What this asymmetry indicates is the neutrality of my
definition of activism, as compared to the more common, ideologically driven
usage of the term. Activism, as I have defined it, is not dependent on legal
correctness-legally correct decisions may nonetheless be activist, just as
erroneous decisions are not necessarily activist. Even though it would be activist
to overrule a clearly erroneous decision solely on grounds of error, this brand of
activism would be a justifiable response if the prior decision was clearly erroneous
in light of constitutional or statutory text. See Smith, Activism as Restraint,
supra note 16, at 1098.
75. The point is nicely made in Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters":
Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1994):

"[T]he most traditional understanding of the common law doctrine
of precedent does not locate the binding power of a prior case in its
author's intentions or words. Instead, the 'material facts' and the
result of a case guide later decisions. The later court evaluates whether
the material or 'important' facts in the prior case are also present in the
case at bar. If so, the judge should reach the same result as in the prior
case, unless she finds other 'important' facts that would distinguish
the case at bar."
Id. at 465-66 (footnotes omitted).
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demands that the Court refrain from overruling cases except on
recognized grounds and faithfully follow prior cases where such
grounds are inapplicable.
So defined, the Rehnquist Court has indeed engaged in
activism in criminal procedure. The problem, however, has not
been overrulings. Those who assail the Court for being activist
would have us believe that overrulings have been common
during Rehnquist's tenure.7 6 In fact, however, the number of
overrulings by the Rehnquist Court has been rather lowaccording to one assessment, "infinitesimal[ly]" so. 77 Moreover,
leading candidates for overruling, such as Miranda, survive.78
Also, on the occasions where the Rehnquist Court has
overruled precedents in criminal procedure, it has been careful
to demonstrate a valid ground for overruling under stare
decisis doctrine. 79 In terms of overrulings, then, the Rehnquist
Court has been fairly restrained.
76. See sources cited in supra note 54.
77. See Christopher P. Banks, Reversals of Precedent and Judicial PolicyMaking: How Judicial Conceptions of Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court
Influence Social Change, 32 AKRON L. REV. 233, 244 (1999) (citing data showing
that "[iun terms of the Court's total docket, the mean rate of overturned cases is
slightly less than one-half percent (.046%)"). In terms of raw data, Banks reports
an average of 2.55 overrulings per Term by the Rehnquist Court, which leads him
to conclude that "the Rehnquist Court is not an activist Court in terms of the
sheer frequency of overruling and overruled cases." Id. at 243. By comparison,
the Warren Court holds the record for most overrulings in a single Term-sevenand overruled thirty-three cases during 1963-69 alone, for a grand total of fortyfive overrulings. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 486 (2000). This rate of overrulings is quite high even adjusting for the
larger docket of the Warren Court.
78. A more accurate way to put it would be that the Court has declined to
overrule Miranda as reshaped and modified in the years following the Warren
Court. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda
but endorsing decades of limitations on Miranda). For an illustration of the
significant differences between Miranda as originally announced and Miranda
doctrine as reaffirmed in Dickerson, see Smith, Activism as Restraint, supra note
16, at 1109-12.
79. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002) (overruling Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 519-21
(1995) (overruling Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929)); United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 709-12 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508
(1990)); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (overruling South Carolina
v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987));
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991) (overruling Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302-05 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (overruling in part Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)). Note that,
of these Rehnquist Court overrulings, only one-Teague-rejected a Warren Court
precedent, an illustration that overrulings were not the way the current Court has
waged counterrevolution in criminal procedure. Even as to Teague, there was
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This does not mean, however, that the Court has been a
model of fidelity to precedent. Instead of overruling Warren
Court precedents it deemed to be erroneous, the Rehnquist
Court
has distinguished, created exceptions to, and
reinterpreted such precedents.
Rarely is this approach
analytically elegant and, much of the time, makes criminal
procedure quite complicated, if not a morass. 80 Whatever else
might be said about the Court's approach, it was highly
effective in producing the "law and order" results Nixon and
Reagan promised to deliver.
Davis v. United States8' is a good example of the Rehnquist
Court's approach to Warren Court precedents in criminal
procedure.
In Davis, the Court confronted an issue of
importance to the integrity of the Miranda regime-namely,
how must police interrogators respond to statements that could
be construed as invocations of Miranda rights? Miranda
doctrine says that all interrogation must cease once a suspect
has invoked his right to counsel,8 2 but until Davis it was
uncertain how clear an invocation had to be to count. The

widespread agreement that the Linkletter standard of retroactivity was in
desperate need of revision.
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 303 (noting that
'commentators have 'had a veritable field day' with the Linkletter standard").
80. Take, for example, the simple question: must evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment be suppressed at trial?
Due to post-Warren
developments in the law, the answer is anything but simple. The general rule is
that suppression is required where the prosecution seeks to use illegally seized
evidence against a criminal defendant. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Impeachment, however, is different, the Court says, so illegally seized evidence
can be used to impeach the defendant who takes the stand in his own defense.
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). There are even circumstances
where illegally obtained evidence can be used as substantive evidence of guilt, in
the prosecution's case-in-chief, instead of simply as evidence impeaching the
defendant's credibility. For example, suppression will not be ordered if the police
would have inevitably discovered the evidence anyway or had an independent
source for the evidence. See Murray v. Carrier, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). Similarly,
evidence will not be suppressed if the officers conducted an illegal search in goodfaith reliance on a defective search warrant, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), a state statute later deemed unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340 (1987), or a warrant mistakenly issued as a result of a clerical error, Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). Even when suppression would otherwise be required,
special Fourth Amendment "standing" rules strictly limit the ability of defendants
to move to suppress evidence obtained in searches of third parties, Minnesota v.
Carter,525 U.S. 83 (1998), and habeas corpus is not available to correct erroneous
denials of exclusionary-rule claims in state trials, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976).
81. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
82. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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investigators in Davis responded to the defendant's ambiguous
statement ("Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.") by asking followup questions to clarify whether he indeed wished to terminate
questioning. The Court was unanimous that such a response
83
was consistent with Miranda.
The majority, however, did not rest on those narrow,
uncontroversial grounds. Instead, five Justices, in an opinion
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, issued a sweeping ruling that
the police can completely disregard a suspect's attempts to
invoke his right to counsel under Miranda,and continue efforts
to secure a confession, unless the invocation is "clear."84 This
ruling simply makes no sense in light of Miranda. The premise
of Miranda is that, given the coercion inherent in custodial
interrogation by police, decisions to confess are not truly
voluntary unless the police advise the suspect of his rights and
demonstrate, by their actions, that they will "scrupulously
85
honor[]" those rights.
It is difficult to imagine a rule more destructive of the
premises of Miranda than the notion that police can flatly
ignore invocations that are not crystal-clear.
Allowing
questioning to continue notwithstanding a potential effort to
request counsel sends the suspect who actually wants a lawyer
the message that the police will not honor his rights and that,
as a practical matter, he has no choice but to confess. It also
weakens the protection of Miranda for the suspects who need it
most: "suspects who-because of fear, intimidation, lack of
linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons-will not clearly
articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to
have a lawyer present."8 6 The only rule consistent with
Miranda was the one offered by the concurring Justices-that
"when law enforcement officials 'reasonably do not know
whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer,' they should stop
87
their interrogation and ask him to make his choice clear."

83. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; id. at 466 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment). The defendant had argued that all questioning must cease in response
to an ambiguous invocation, a view that no justice endorsed.
84. See id. at 461 ("We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning
until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney."); see also id. at 459
(stating that "the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.").
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
86. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460.
87. Id. at 467 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
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The majority's contrary ruling can be seen only as an effort to
limit Miranda while giving the appearance of adhering to it.
Handling perceived erroneous precedent in this way may be
perfectly understandable as an alternative to a controversial
88
overruling, but it is judicial activism nonetheless.
CONCLUSION

At the conclusion of every contest, a contestant is declared
the winner.
So, who won the showdown in criminal
procedure-Earl Warren or William Rehnquist? The answer is
surprising: they both did.
Criminal procedure remains
thoroughly
constitutionalized,
with
rules
of federal
constitutional law covering virtually every aspect of the
criminal justice system. Even if the Rehnquist Court were to
last another two decades, there would be no going back to the
days of old when criminal procedure was almost entirely a
state-law subject. To this extent, Warren won, and his victory
is now probably for the ages.
Warren, however, has to share the victory circle with
Rehnquist. Rehnquist, unable to get his first-best preference
(overruling Miranda and other Warren-era precedents), went
for-and got-second-best. Disfavored Warren Court doctrines
were altered through case-by-case adjudication so that they no
longer threatened what Rehnquist and his "law and order"
colleagues regarded as "legitimate law enforcement."8 9 The
results have been dramatic: much evidence that the Warren
Court would have suppressed under Miranda or Mapp now
comes into evidence again, and habeas petitions that might
have been successful even a generation ago are now doomed to
failure. Thanks to the Rehnquist Court, in short, things are
again rosy for law enforcement.
88. This descriptive conclusion, if correct, raises a larger normative
question: was it principled for the Rehnquist Court to resort activism in criminal
procedure? In one sense, the question seems to answer itself, for the common
assumption, especially among judicial conservatives, is that activism, liberal or
conservative, is per se unprincipled. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, JudicialActivism
of the Right: A Mistaken And Futile Hope, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (E. Paul & H. Dickman eds., 1990).

As I argue elsewhere, this argument is basically right, except that activism
promotes restraint-and therefore is principled-when used to redress prior
instances ofjudicial activism. See Smith, Activism as Restraint, supra note 16, at
1097-1115.
89. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
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Regardless of who succeeds Rehnquist as Chief Justice, it
is unlikely that defendants will ever see anything like the
heady days of the Warren Court again. If that stunning
reversal of fortune resulted from activism by the Rehnquist
Court, I would venture to say that police, prosecutors, and
crime victims are appreciative nonetheless.
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